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The U.S. Supreme Court Sidetracks Idaho Implied Consent Law
Richard SeamonIAI hen the Idaho police
stop a driver reason-
V V ably suspected ofdriving und r the
influence of alcohol
or drugs (DUI), Idaho's "implied
consent" law authorizes them to
have the driver's blood drawn (typi-
cally at a hospital) for testing.' Idaho
case law lets these blood draws oc-
cur without the warrants that the
Fourth Amendment usually requires
for such "search[es]" of "person[s]
2
The Idaho case law holds that these
blood draws may occur without
warrants because the blood draws
invariably fall within the warrant ex-
ceptions for "exigent circumstances"
and "consent searches"
This article explains that neither
exception validates all warrantless
blood draws under Idaho's implied
consent law. In Missouri v. McNeely,
the U.S. Supreme Court recently
overruled Idaho case law holding
that the natural dissipation of alco-
hol in the blood, per se, establishes
exigent circumstances.3 And U.S.
Supreme Court case law on consent
searches undermines the Idaho case
law upholding warrantless, noncon-
sensual blood draws under an "im-
plied consent" theory.
Idaho's implied consent
law and related case law
You can understand Idaho's im-
plied consent law by envisioning the
typical situation in which an Idaho
police officer pulls over a driver rea-
sonably suspected of DUI. First, the
officer observes the driver for signs
of DUI, including the driver's per-
formance of field sobriety tests like
standing on one leg. The officer may
then decide to have the driver tested
with a breathalyzer or a blood draw.
To focus on the situation presented
in Missouri v. McNeely, this article
assumes our Idaho police officer de-
cides on a blood draw.
Before testing, Idaho's implied
consent law requires the officer to
give the driver information. The
driver learns: By driving on Ida-
ho's roads, she is "deemed to have
given . . . consent" to testing for
alcohol or drugs if there are rea-
sonable grounds to believe she is
driving under the influence of one
or both.4 If she refuses to take the
test or doesn't complete it, she may
be fined $250 and have her license
suspended for at least one year; she
can avoid those penalties only if she
shows good cause at a court hear-
ing.' If- instead of refusing to take
or not completing the test - she
takes the test and fails it, her license
will be suspended for at least 90
days, unless she shows good cause
at an administrative hearing before
the Department of Transportation.
Having heard this advice, the driver
decides whether or not to take the
blood test.
Readers will notice that the
driver who refuses to submit to a
blood test faces stiffer administra-
tive penalties - a $250 civil fine
and a driver's license suspension of
at least one year - than the driver
U.S. Supreme Court case law on
consent searches undermines the
Idaho case law upholding
warrantless, nonconsensual
blood draws under an
"implied consent" theory.
who takes the test and fails it, who
faces no civil penalty and may suffer
an administrative suspension that
can be as short as 90 days. The stiffer
administrative penalties for refusal
to submit to a test reflect the legis-
lature's intent "to discourage and
civilly penalize such a refusal." The
legislature wants drivers suspected
of DUI to submit to blood tests so
that, if they are in fact DUI, the tests
yield objective evidence to prosecute
them.
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By administratively penalizing
the refusal to submit to a blood test,
Idaho's implied consent law does
not create a statutory right of refus-
al. 8 Indeed, once a driver has - by
operation of the law - impliedly
consented to a blood test by using
Idaho's roads, the driver cannot re-
voke that consent by refusing to
submit to the test if the police have
reasonable grounds to believe the
driver is DUI. 9 Thus, if the driver re-
fuses to submit to a blood test, the
police can subject the driver to what
is commonly called a "forced" blood
draw.10
The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that the police do not need
a warrant for a forced blood draw.
The court has held that forced blood
draws fall within either of two excep-
tions to the warrant requirement.
First, the court held in State v.
Woolery that forced blood draws fall
within the exigent circumstances ex-
ception. The Woolery court reasoned
that "the destruction of the evidence
by metabolism of alcohol in the
blood provides an inherent exigen-
cy which justifies the warrantless
search"" This "inherent exigency"
theory treats the metabolization of
blood as enough, standing alone, to
establish exigent circumstances.
Second, the court held in State
v. Diaz that forced blood draws are
valid as consent searches. The Diaz
court recognized that the "forced"
drawing of Benito Diaz's blood was
"involuntary', because it occurred
despite his "continued ... protest."
12
Still, the blood draw qualified as a
consensual search because the police
had reasonable grounds to believe
that Mr. Diaz was DUI. In that situa-
tion, Mr. Diaz "had already given his
implied consent" to the blood draw
"by driving on an Idaho road" 3 Ac-
cording to the court, his protests im-
mediately before the forced blood
draw did not revoke his prior (im-
plied) consent, because under Idaho
precedent he had no right to revoke
that consent.
14
Thus, Idaho case law uses a belt-
and-suspenders approach to reject
Fourth Amendment challenges to
forced, warrantless blood draws
from drivers reasonably suspected
of DUI: The metabolization of alco-
hol in the blood, per se, establishes
exigent circumstances; alternatively,
forced blood draws occur with the
statutorily implied consent of the
driver, and are thus sustainable as
consent searches, even when the
driver actually refuses to submit to
the test.
As discussed next, the U.S. Su-
preme Court's decision in McNeely
v. Missouri makes clear that the exi-
gent circumstances belt is not large
enough to uphold all forced, war-
rantless blood draws. And when the
exigent circumstances belt does not
fit, the implied consent suspend-
ers snap under the pressure of U.S.
Supreme Court precedent on con-
sent searches. Metaphors and case
law aside, warrantless, forced blood
draws violate the Fourth Amend-
ment in the absence of exigent cir-
cumstances.
McNeely v. Missouri's rejection of the
per se exigent circumstances theory
The U.S. Supreme Court held in
Missouri v. McNeely that "the natu-
ral metabolization of alcohol in the
bloodstream" does not "presen[t] a
per se exigency that justifies an ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement for noncon-
sensual blood testing in all drunk-
driving cases " 5 Instead, courts must
use a "totality of the circumstances"
approach to determine exigent cir-
cumstances. The natural dissipation
of alcohol in blood is just one cir-
cumstance, and it must be consid-
ered with other factors, such as the
ease and speed with which the po-
lice could get a warrant in the par-
ticular case. 6
McNeely rejects the state-court
decisions that upheld warrantless
blood draws under the "per se exi-
gency" theory. Among the rejected
state-court cases that the McNeely
Court cited was the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision in Woolery.'7 Be-
cause of McNeely's rejection of the
per se exigency theory, the exigent
circumstances exception cannot
justify all warrantless, forced blood
draws authorized by Idaho's implied
consent law. The question thus aris-
es: Can the warrantless, forced blood
draws that aren't justified by exigent
circumstances be justified, instead,
by the implied-consent theory upon
which the Idaho Supreme Court re-
lied in Diaz?
McNeely does not directly address
that question. Justice Sotomayor
did, however, address implied con-
sent laws in a portion of her McNeely
opinion that did not have the sup-
port of the majority of the Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in McNeely v. Missouri makes clear
that the exigent circumstances belt is not large enough to
uphold all forced, warrantless blood draws.
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She wrote that implied consent laws
provide an effective alternative to
warrantless, nonconsensual blood
draws:
States have a broad range of legal
tools to enforce their drunk-driv-
ing laws and to secure BAC [Blood
Alcohol Content] evidence with-
out undertaking warrantless non-
consensual blood draws. For ex-
ample, all 50 states have adopted
implied consent laws that require
motorists, as a condition of oper-
ating a motor vehicle within the
State, to consent to BAC testing
if they are arrested or otherwise
detained on suspicion of a drunk-
driving offense. Such laws impose
significant consequences when
a motorist withdraws consent;
typically the motorist's driver's
license is immediately suspended
or revoked, and most States al-
low the motorist's refusal to take
a BAC test to be used as evidence
against him in a subsequent crim-
inal prosecution.18
This statement clearly suggests
that a state may encourage drivers
to consent to blood draws by penal-
izing their refusal to consent. On
the other hand, it does not address
whether, if the driver refuses to give
actual consent, the state can rely on
their implied consent to justify a
forced blood draw. The next section
argues the answer is no.
The invalidity of the irrevocable-
implied-consent theory
As discussed above, the Idaho
Supreme Court in Diaz held that a
warrantless, forced blood draw is
a valid consent search. This author
respectfully suggests that Diaz con-
flicts with U.S. Supreme Court case
law holding that consent to a search
must be voluntary and that the
scope of consent can be restricted.
This case law implies that consent,
once given, can be revoked. Implied
consent under Idaho's implied con-
sent law, however, is neither volun-
tary nor revocable. It therefore can-
not justify warrantless, forced blood
draws.
The leading U.S. Supreme Court
case on consent searches is Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte.19 There, the Court
upheld the police's warrantless
search of Robert Bustamonte's car
because he consented to the search.
His consent was valid because it was
voluntary. The Court explained that
voluntariness is judged under the
"totality of the circumstances' and
that consent is not voluntary if it is
"the product of duress or coercion,
express or implied 20
Implied consent under Idaho's
implied consent law is not volun-
tary. Its involuntariness becomes
clear if you imagine an Idaho of-
ficial telling an Idaho resident ap-
plying for an Idaho driver's license:
"To drive on Idaho's roads, you must
consent to having your blood tested
if the police stop you with reason-
able grounds to believe you are DUI.
Do you consent?" How many Idaho
residents would say no, if they knew
Implied consent under Idaho's
implied consent law, however,
is neither voluntary nor
revocable. It therefore cannot
justify warrantless, forced
blood draws.
that doing so would bar them from
driving in Idaho? For most Idaho
residents, driving in Idaho is a daily
necessity. The implied consent law
makes them an offer they can't re-
fuse. In turn, their acceptance of that
offer is not voluntary.
But even if a driver's initial con-
sent were voluntary, it would not
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justify a forced blood draw when the
driver later refuses to submit to it.
Just as a person can restrict the scope
of his or her consent to a search,2 a
person should be able to revoke con-
sent previously given.2 2 In a sense,
voluntariness and revocability go
together. The Idaho Supreme Court
unwittingly proved this point when
it used the implied-consent theory
in Diaz to uphold what the Court it-
self characterized as an "involuntary"
blood draw. A consensual, "involun-
tary" blood draw is an oxymoron.
In sum, a warrantless, forced
blood draw from a driver suspected
of DUI satisfies the Fourth Amend-
ment if exigent circumstances exist
in the particular case. But if they do
not, the irrevocable-implied-consent
theory cannot provide an alternative
justification.
The permissibility of administratively
penalizing drivers who refuse to
submit to blood tests
The last section focused on driv-
ers who, despite "implied consent;
actually refuse to submit to a blood
test when stopped by police for DUI.
Many drivers in this situation, how-
ever, will actually consent to a blood
test, to avoid the $250 fine and one-
year suspension of their license. It
is unsettled whether states can con-
stitutionally use such administra-
tive penalties to encourage people
to consent. Justice Sotomayor sug-
gested in McNeely that such admin-
istrative schemes are constitutional,
a suggestion to which three other
Justices subscribed. This author pre-
dicts that a majority of the Court
would agree, on one of two grounds.
First, the Court might conclude
that consent to a blood test can be
voluntary even if given to avoid ad-
ministrative penalties. The prospect
of penalties arguably exerts less pres-
sure than circumstances that, the
Court has found, did not render
consent to a search involuntary.23
In McNeely, the Court refused to rule that the metabolization of alcohol,
per se, establishes exigent circumstances, because the per se approach
conflicted with the totality of circumstances analysis used to analyze
exigent circumstances.
Furthermore, many drivers would
rather have their licenses adminis-
tratively suspended for a year (and
pay a fine) than submit to a test that
ensures their conviction for criminal
DUI.
Even so, this author suspects the
Court would not rely on a consent
theory to uphold the administrative
penalty schemes in implied consent
laws like Idaho's. That is because
voluntariness analysis, like exigent-
circumstances analysis, examines the
"totality of the circumstances' which
would include, in this context, the
characteristics of the individual driv-
er and other circumstances of the
traffic stop. In McNeely, the Court re-
fused to rule that the metabolization
of alcohol, per se, establishes exigent
circumstances, because the per se ap-
proach conflicted with the totality of
circumstances analysis used to ana-
lyze exigent circumstances. Likewise,
the Court will probably refuse to
rule as a categorical matter that the
prospect of administrative penalties
will never make a driver's consent
to a blood search involuntary; such
a categorical ruling conflicts with
the totality of circumstances analy-
sis used to analyze voluntariness. In
sum, the Court cannot easily use its
case law on consent searches to give
a blanket blessing to the administra-
tive penalty schemes in implied con-
sent laws.
A more promising approach uses
Fourth Amendment reasonableness
analysis to uphold these administra-
tive penalty schemes. The Court has
said that "the ultimate measure of the
constitutionality of a governmental
search is 'reasonableness'" and that
"where there was no clear practice,
either approving or disapproving
the type of search at issue, at the
time [the Fourth Amendment] was
enacted, whether a particular search
meets the reasonableness standard is
judged by balancing its instruction
on the individual's Fourth Amend-
ment interests against its promotion
of legitimate governmental inter-
ests' 2 4 Furthermore, a leading trea-
tise endorses reasonableness analy-
sis for blood tests of drivers under
implied consent laws.2 Finally, two
of the Court's cases support using a
reasonableness analysis.
In those cases, the Court used a
reasonableness analysis to uphold
warrantless searches of probationers
and parolees. In each case, the subject
of the search "consented" to them as
a condition of probation or parole.
But the Court expressly refused to
rely on consent, and relied instead
on a reasonableness analysis. 26 The
Court might have eschewed the con-
sent rationale so it could issue deci-
sions generally upholding searches
of probationers and parolees.
Strong arguments support the
reasonableness of administrative
penalties encouraging drivers sus-
pected of DUI to submit to blood
tests. The state has a huge interest in
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taking impaired drivers off the roads.
True, drivers have a weighty interest
in avoiding the bodily intrusion of
blood testing. But the intrusion is
mitigated by the information that
officers must give drivers before test-
ing. It could be further mitigated by
state efforts to give drivers actual,
advance notice - when issuing driv-
ers' licenses, for example - of the
implied consent law.
Conclusion
U.S. Supreme Court case law
sidetracks Idaho's implied consent
law but does not run it entirely off
the road. Exigent circumstances will
often justify warrantless blood draws
from drivers suspected of DUI. Al-
ternatively, many drivers will submit
to warrantless blood draws to avoid
administrative penalties that the U.S.
Supreme Court would likely uphold
as reasonable, especially if Idaho
strives to give Idaho drivers actual
notice of the implied consent law.
But if exigent circumstances don't
exist and the driver refuses to sub-
mit, a warrantless, forced blood draw
violates the Fourth Amendment.
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